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BENJAMIN HARRISON AND THE 
AMERICAN WEST 
HOMER E. SOCOLOFSKY 
In a speech in Pocatello, Idaho, in 1891, 
President Benjamin Harrison expressed his 
admiration for the pioneers of the American 
West: 
My sympathy and interest have always 
gone out to those who, leaving the settled 
and populous parts of our country, have 
pushed the frontiers of civilization farther 
and farther to the westward until they have 
met the Pacific Ocean and the setting sun. 
Pioneers have always been enterprising 
people. If they had not been they would 
have remained at home; they endured great 
hardships and perils in opening these great 
mines . . . and in bringing into subjection 
these wild plains and making them blossom 
like gardens.! 
Harrison had always been fascinated by the 
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West. To a college chum he spoke of settling in 
either San Francisco or Chicago, and in 1854 
he chose Indianapolis as his home town. By 
the time he had served six years as a U.S. 
senator and was nominated for president in 
1888, he was described as a westerner. His only 
son, Russell, lived in territorial Montana for 
several years. President Harrison's stance on 
the issue of Chinese immigration gives further 
evidence of his close contact with western 
attitudes. 
Harrison had widespread support for the 
Republican nomination for president at Chi-
cago in 1888. He had served in the Senate from 
1881 to 1887, and most western senators in the 
convention gave him their vote. Harrison 
received much of the support that would have 
gone to James O. Blaine, had he been candi-
date. Blaine took himself out of the race and 
Stephen Benton Elkins, a financier from New 
York City and West Virginia with important 
connections in New Mexico, helped engineer 
Harrison's nomination on the eighth ballot. 
By that time, the votes of delegates from the 
West, as well as from certain populous eastern 
states, pushed his total above the majority 
mark. Westerners regarded Harrison as a 
candidate from their area who would under-
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stand the special problems of the West. 
Many of the domestic issues facing the 
Harrison administration (1889-1893) were of 
immediate concern to western interests: 
statehood for western territories, appoint-
ments to public office, national policy for 
natural resources, the monetary issue of silver, 
and the role of the federal government in local 
affairs. Tariff policy, a dominant issue else-
where in the country, was relatively less vital 
to most of the American West at this time. 
NEW STATES IN THE WEST 
In his inaugural address President Harrison 
said, "It is a subject of congratulations that 
there is a near prospect of the admission into 
the Union of the Dakotas and Montana and 
W ashington Territories. This act of justice has 
been unreasonably delayed."2 So the time was 
ripe for new states; none had been admitted 
since Colorado in 1876. Most territorial resi-
dents saw statehood as an opportunity for 
greater self-government, and the 1888 election 
of a Republican majority in both houses of 
Congress raised their hopes for such a change. 
Over the course of nine days in November 
1889, four new states were admitted-North 
and South Dakota, Montana, and W ashing-
ton. Eight months later, in early July 1980, 
Idaho and Wyoming were given statehood. 
The population of Dakota Territory had 
long been sufficient for statehood. While in the 
Senate, Harrison had sponsored a Dakota 
statehood bill that passed early in 1886. A 
Democratic-controlled House committee con-
sidered the possibility of New Mexico as a state 
to "match" Dakota, but ultimately refused to 
submit the Harrison bill. Dominant groups in 
Dakota Territory favored admission as two 
states, and their goal was obtainable when 
Harrison was elected. At the end of the 
Cleveland administration, the lame-duck Con-
gress of 1888-89 passed the enabling legislation, 
knowing that their action provided an imme-
diate political liability to the Democratic 
party.] 
Harrison signed the admission proclama-
tion for the twin states of North and South 
Dakota on 2 November 1889. In his History of 
South Dakota Herbert Schell observes that 
"neither state can claim priority over the 
other, as President Harrison purposely shuffled 
the admission documents so that none might 
know which came first. By common agreement 
reached in later years North Dakota holds 
.thirty-ninth and South Dakota fortieth rank 
among the states of the Union."4 In Montana, 
consensus for statehood was widespread and 
the formal proclamation was signed on 8 
November 1889.5 Washington statehood came 
two days later, and in 1890, on 3 July and 10 
July, Idaho and Wyoming were added to the 
roster of states. With these new states, Republi-
can strength in the Senate was increased by 
twelve, and there were seven more Republi-
cans in the House.6 No other president in U.S. 
history signed admission papers for as many 
states as Harrison did. 
ApPOINTMENTS To PUBLIC OFFICE 
Patronage demands created the most diffi-
culty for President Harrison and were the basis 
for the greatest number of complaints against 
his administration. Popular myths, repeated 
almost a century later, hold that Harrison said, 
"When I came into power I found that the 
party managers had taken it all to themselves. I 
could not name my own Cabinet. They sold 
out every place to pay the elections expenses."1 
Testimony is much stronger that this was a 
fallacious report and that Harrison actually 
had the final say on appointments. Even Matt 
Quay, who became Harrison's campaign man-
ager after the national nominating conven-
tion, "received almost incontrovertible 
evidence that the Hoosier would not bargain." 
Western railroad magnate James J. Hill was 
reputed to have offered fifty thousand dollars 
to the fall campaign on condition that Harri-
son would select a secretary of the interior 
from a list of three names provided by Hill.s 
Harrison always said no to offers like Hill's. 
Throughout the period he wrote letters such as 
the following to a correspondent from Ohio: 
I was nominated at Chicago without the 
smallest promise of any sort relating to 
federal appointments and I am now abso-
lutely without any promise or entangle-
ments of any sort. I deemed it altogether 
improper to commit myself to any such 
matter before the convention and I have 
regarded the same rule as the only right one 
since. It is impossible, therefore, for me to 
discuss now the question which you present 
for my consideration. If I should be elected, 
I will not only be willing but would regard it 
as a duty to listen to the suggestions and 
counsel of my Republican friends and to 
give them such weight as they seem to be 
entitled to.9 
Harrison spend much of his time between 
the election and inauguration in considering 
appointments to the cabinet and to other 
positions. He employed a "carefully graded 
and recognized system of institutional stand-
ing" in making his appointments. Senatorial 
courtesy played a large role in what he did and 
he customarily queried people he knew about a 
candidate's qualifications. lO Cabinet appoint-
ments were made to people he had not known 
previously, and he interviewed such candi-
dates. As a member of the Blaine faction of the 
Republican party, he could hardly avoid 
choosing the "Plumed Knight" from Maine as 
his secretary of state, but when he made the 
appointment he was criticized both for select-
ing Blaine and for delaying that action so long. 
Harrison was determined to name a cabinet 
that included no state party bosses, and for 
that he was criticized." In his cabinet members 
he wanted party loyalty as well as identifica-
tion with particular states. Three of Harrison's 
eight cabient appointees were from western 
states; his attorney general was a nonpolitical 
law partner from Indianapolis, W. H. H. 
Miller. 
Filling the cabinet positions was a long and 
involved process. With less than five weeks 
before inauguration only Blaine had been 
appointed and Harrison replied to one corre-
spondent that "I cannot and have not appor-
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tioned any of the offices to any state or to any 
individuals."i2 His technique was explained to 
an Indiana friend. 
When I have concluded that it would be 
right to give a certain state or section a 
cabinet appointment the next thing is to 
find a man to fill the place creditably. When 
I have done that I am frequently, indeed 
usually, met with opposition to the appoint-
ment, the suggestion coming that it would 
be rather hurtful than helpful. Indeed, I 
have about reached the conclusion that it is 
quite doubtful whether a cabinet appoint-
ment in any state is of much local benefit.13 
Harrison refused to consider New Yorkers 
for secretary of the treasury: in his estimation 
they were too close to Wall Street. Determined 
to have a westerner instead, he sought Senator 
William B. Allison of Iowa. When Allison 
declined, Harrison picked William Windom of 
Minnesota, who had served in that post in 
Garfield's cabinet. i4 Apparently, David J. 
Brewer, judge of the federal circuit court at 
Leavenworth, Kansas, was under consider-
ation for some position, but Harrison was 
advised that "he cannot afford a Cabinet place 
and should be constrained to decline if the 
place were offered him."i5 Brewer was subse-
quently appointed to the first vacancy in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. John W. Noble, of St. 
Louis, Missouri, was named secretary of the 
interior. When the secretary of ag~iculture was 
elevated to cabinet status on 9 February 1889, 
another cabinet position was available, and on 
the eve of inauguration, a close friend of 
Harrison's, Senator John C. Spooner of Wis-
consin, secured that post for Wisconsin Gover-
nor Jeremiah M. Rusk. i6 
Unfortunately for Harrison's political fu-
ture, his method of building a cabinet made no 
attempt to "balance off claims of party bosses 
and reformers." Neither did it "reward indis-
criminately younger politicians with a prom-
ising future."il Even in his later cabinet 
appointments Harrison tended to disregard 
personal political advantage. is Harrison's inde-
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pendent choice of a cabinet brought a chilling 
comment from an advisor, Stephen B. Elkins: 
"Republicans complain that of the eight men 
in the Cabinet only one of them was in the 
Convention. Not one of the whole Cabinet 
did anything for you to bring about your 
nomination and ... this is an abandonment of 
friends."19 Except for Blaine, the members of ' 
Harrison's cabinet 'vere obscure nationally 
and weak politically. It was "well balanced, but 
neither brilliant nor exceptionally strong. "20 
Harrison would be his own boss and the 
important matters in his administration would 
have his imprint. The friendly New York 
Tribune published this comment on 6 March 
1889: 
The cabinet represented National Re-
publicanism. It belongs to no faction, 
appeals to no prejudice and threatens no 
revenges. From the first name to the last it is 
made up in the interest of good govern-
ment .... 
The cabinet represents and will carry 
into execution the policies and instincts of 
President Harrison and of the united party 
in whose name he will see to it that the 
Republic takes no harm. 
James Clarkson of Iowa was appointed the 
first assistant postmaster general, with primary 
responsibility for satisfying local Republican 
patronage demands. Clarkson and James Tan-
ner of New York, who was named commission-
er of pensions, were Harrison's most 
controversial appointments. Tanner lasted 
only six months, whereas Clarkson resigned in 
September 1890 to organize Republican con-
gressional campaigns. Clarkson, never re-
strained in his job by Harrison, was under 
obligation to find loyal Republicans for the 
fourth-class postmaster positions all over the 
country. In a letter dated 25 May 1889, he 
wrote that he was "most anxious to get 
through with [his} task here and leave" as he 
was "simply on detail from the National 
Committee to see that some of the men who 
fought with us splendidly last year are re-
warded."21 Both Tanner and Clarkson had 
sufficient political clout to receive federal 
appointments when Theodore Roosevelt was 
in the White House. 22 
During the presidential campaign of 1888 
President Harrison barely mentioned the topic 
of civil service reform. Reformers supporting a 
federal merit system split between Harrison 
and Cleveland. With Harrison's election the 
reformers expected great advances on behalf of 
the merit system, and except for Cleveland's 
lame-duck additions, they were soon disap-
pointed. Only in his appointments of The-
odore Roosevelt and Hugh S. Thompson to 
the Civil Service Commission did Harrison get 
good marks from reformers.23 However, half of 
Harrison's cabinet members were sympathetic 
with the work of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, one was passive, and only three-Blaine, 
Wanamaker, and Miller-were on the reform-
ers' blacklist. 24 
President Harrison spent from four to six 
hours each day during his first eighteen 
months in office working on patronage. De-
mands for federal appointments were so insis-
tent and pressing that he could not do enough 
to satisfy the job seekers. Neither did he satisfy 
the advocates of civil service reform. Rarely 
did Harrison have an uninterrupted hour at 
his desk during his first year as president. It 
was no wonder that "he seemed suspicious of 
people, was noncommital in conversation, and 
often assumed a superior air which was exas-
perating to many who came in contact with 
him."25 Through this period Harrison gained a 
reputation as a cool, insensitive iceberg in the 
White House, a reputation that has been 
enhanced in the retelling. Harrison recalled 
later that "in the power of appointment to 
office the President finds the most exacting, 
unrelenting, and distracting of his duties. In 
the nature of things he begins to make enemies 
from the start, and has no way to escape."26 
Years later his private secretary summed up 
general criticism of Benjamin Harrison as 
growing "almost entirely out of appoint-
ments."27 
Not until the second half of his administra-
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tion did Harrison add employees to the merit 
system. By executive order on 13 April 1891, 
he granted 626 physicians and other agency 
employees in the Indian Service, primarily 
located in the West, a civil service classifica-
tion. In 1892, 140 members of the Fish 
Commission were included in civil service. 
These additions to the merit system came 
because of Harrison's willingness to "recognize 
the importance of special training and skill 
where party interests were not especially 
vital."28 Most of the 10,535 positions Harrison 
added to the merit system were acted on 
during the lame-duck part of his term. 29 
POLICY ON NATURAL RESOURCES 
Perhaps the most important and longest-
lasting piece of legislation affecting the West to 
come out of the Harrison administration was a 
small section in the general land revison act 
that was passed on 3 March 1891. The entire 
law reversed more than a century of federal 
land policy aimed at transferring public land to 
private ownership.30 Section 24 of this law 
became known as the Forest Reserve Act of 
1891. Belatedly added to the 1891 law and 
passed without the usual parliamentary proce-
dures-it was not printed for study by mem-
bers of Congress before it was approved-this 
act was the basic legislation providing for the 
creation of national forests in the United 
States. It stated that 
the President of the United States may, 
from time to time, set apart and reserve, in 
any State or Territory having public land 
bearing forests, in any part of the public 
lands wholly or in part covered with timber 
or undergrowth, whether of commercial 
value or not, as public reservations, and the 
President shall, by public proclamation, 
declare the establishment of such reserva-
tions and the limits thereof. 31 
Details are lacking on how the forest 
reserve proposal was added to the land act of 
1891, but certain actions tie Benjamin Harri-
son to the clause favoring the new national 
reserves. For instance, in April 1890, represen-
tatives of the law committee of the American 
Forestry Congress (renamed the next year as 
the American Forestry Association) presented 
a petition to President Harrison and described 
the necessity of protecting the nation's rich 
natural resources. As was his manner, Harri-
son made no direct reply to the petition, but 
he cordially received the committee and for-
warded the petition to Congress. Later the 
same committee met with Secretary of the 
Interior John W. Noble and they memorialized 
Congress on the need to set aside forest 
reservations. 
The chief of the Division of Forestry, Dr. 
Bernhard Fernow, later recalled that Secretary 
Noble told the joint conference committee in 
the eleventh hour that he "would not let the 
President sign the bill . . . unless the Reserva-
tion clause were inserted."32 A contemporary 
observer stated that Section 24 "was in the 
hands of western men to a large extent." Since 
Harrison and Noble were dissatisfied with the 
initial bill, "western Senators went back and 
forth to the White House during the night in 
an effort to have it shaped up so as to secure 
the Presidential approval. "33 
In a speech delivered in 1908, John W. 
Noble recalled that the "first impressive ap-
peal" for a forest reservation policy came 
slightly earlier, in January 1890, when Harri-
son "transmitted to Congress, a memorial ... 
and recommended that adequate steps be 
taken to prevent the rapid destruction of our 
great forest areas and the loss of our water 
supplies." Noble also described the night of 3 
March 1891, when President Harrison waited 
in an anteroom near Congress to sign bills that 
had been approved. When the land revision 
bill came for his signature, he asked Noble 
whether it was "as it should be, and being 
advised it was, because of the authority to 
make reservations was thereby given, he said 
Then I will sign it' and he did."34 
In addition to Fernow and Noble, Edward 
A. Bowers of the General Land Office, Sen-
ators R. E. Pettigrew and Preston Plumb, and 
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Robert Underwood Johnson all claimed credit 
for the success of getting Section 24 through 
Congress. Others, including John Muir and 
numerous congressmen, deserved recognition 
also, as the idea of national forests had been 
around for years. Bowers was the probable 
author of the forest reserve paragraph, which 
contained neither a purpose for the reserves 
nor a means of administering them.35 
Before a month had passed, President 
Harrison authorized a forest reserve in Wyom-
ing adjacent to Yellowstone Park, and it was 
enlarged later in the same year. 36 Fourteen 
additional reserves in the territories of Alaska, 
Arizona, and New Mexico and in the states of 
California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washing-
ton were established during the remainder of 
his term. Harrison's proclamations brought 
the total national forest area to more than 
twenty-two million acres, about 111/2 percent 
of the national forest system of later years.37 
Some accounts of the Forest Reserve Act 
have emphasized the fortuitous circumstances 
that brought the federal government into a 
conservation program when the Senate was 
historically opposed to such measures. Others 
believed that the withdrawals carried out by 
Harrison and others "provoked bitter opposi-
tion on the part of many inhabitants and 
interests in the West."38 More recent schol-
arship holds that Section 24 was not "thrust 
on an unwilling Congress," and that the West 
did not declare "war upon the reserves." In 
fact, throughout the Harrison and the second 
Cleveland administrations, western opinion 
was as supportive of Section 24 as was Con-
gress. Western newspapers made almost no 
comment, and most of these forest reservations 
were created because of petitions signed by 
area citizens. Neither was there any move in 
Congress to deprive the president of authority 
to set aside forest lands or cancel existing 
reserves. 39 Gifford Pinchot, later chief forester, 
called Section 24 "the most important legisla-
tion in the history of Forestry in American."40 
THE FREE SILVER QUESTION 
Certainly, silver legislation of some kind 
was inevitable for the Harrison administra-
tion. William Stewart, a senator from Nevada, 
queried Harrison on the free silver issue before 
the Republican convention in 1888 and felt 
assured that the Indianan would not oppose a 
free coinage bill. Consequently, western dele-
gates gravitated to Harrison as other western-
ers dropped out of the race, and he won the 
nomination. Cleveland, his opponent for 
president, was a known opponent of silver, 
while Harrison "posed as a friend of silver 
without ever committing himself to free coin-
age."41 Following the election a cordial letter 
from Harrison to Senator Henry M. Teller, of 
Colorado, strengthened the impression that 
Harrison favored free silver. Moreover, Harri-
son's selection of William Windom as his 
secretary of the treasury was considered anoth-
er good sign for silver. In his first annual 
message to Congress, Harrison stated, "I have 
always been an advocate of the use of silver in 
our currency . We are large producers of that 
metal and should not discredit it."42 Most of 
the new members of Congress from the six 
recently admitted states favored free coinage of 
silver and added their supportY 
So it was a surprise to Senator Teller, one 
of the leaders of the silver movement, to learn 
on a visit to the White House in January 1890 
that Harrison was not the strong advocate of 
silver that he had expected. Teller met with 
Harrison to tell him of his opposition to 
Secretary of the Treasury Windom's plan to 
increase the use of silver in the money supply 
on the grounds that the plan did not go far 
enough. Harrison agreed that Windom's pro-
posal had shortcomings, but he identified it as 
a "Republican bill" and announced that he 
would veto a bill "going so far as to be 
unsound."44 A bill that included Windom's 
compromise scheme for buying most of the 
nation's silver output was one of the more 
than twenty silver bills introduced into Con-
gress. As such, it gained little support from 
either silverites or gold standard men. 
By 7 June 1890, a Senate bill to purchase 
41/2 million ounces of silver each month was 
approved by a House committee. Before a final 
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vote, supporters of free silver balked and 
delayed action. Later that month the Senate 
passed a bill providing free coinage of silver. 
House Speaker Thomas Reed worked hard to 
defeat the measure, and his efforts were 
successful by a narrow margin. Finally, on 7 
July 1890 Congress passed another compro-
mise bill, similar to the bill that had almost 
been approved a month earlier. The passage of 
this bill, known as the Sherman Silver Pur-
chase Act, was described as a victory by 
President Harrison. Some members of Con-
gress who would have been expected to oppose 
this measure supported it because they were 
wary of Harrison's action should he be con-
fronted with a more extreme bill that was fully 
supported by western silverites. Unsure about 
the president's attitude, these congressmen 
feared he might "feel at liberty to veto" a free 
silver billY 
Harrison believed that he would "end a 
controversy by signing" the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act, but this compromise failed to 
still the critics. Since he had been tardy in 
clarifying his position on free silver, he quickly 
lost the support of Silver Republicans, includ-
ing Senator Teller.46 Legislation favored by 
Harrison-the federal elections bill as well as 
the Blair educational bill-failed to make it 
through Congress. Part of the blame rests with 
the conflicts over silver. The outcome of the 
midterm election of 1890, which produced a 
sizable majority for the Democrats in the 
House of Representatives, shows the volatile 
character of the silver issue and the other 
measures passed during the first half of the 
Harrison administration. Still, the president 
wrote on 14 April 1891 that he had "always 
believed, and do now more than ever believe 
in bimetallism, and favor the fullest use of 
silver in connection with our currency that is 
compatible with the maintenance of the parity 
of gold and silver dollars in their commercial 
use." He added that he had been "assured by 
leading advocates of free coinage-representa-
tives of the silver States" -that the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act would "promptly and 
permanently bring silver to $1.29 per ounce 
and keep it there. That anticipation has not 
been realized."48 
In a 1907 publication dealing with the 
silver issue and other national problems, Davis 
Rich Dewey, a nonwestern writer, expressed 
the opinion that the responsibility for this 
compromise and its failure was in the hands of 
Benjamin Harrison and his eastern advisers. In 
Dewey's view, 
No incident in our national history 
more forcibly illustrates the lack of deter-
mined statesmanship. If the president, sup-
ported by senators and representatives from 
the East, who had opposed the free coinage 
of silver, without an international 
agreement, had fought the silver proposi-
tions at every step, it would have been 
impossible to pass the silver-purchase bill.48 
LOCAL ISSUES IN THE WEST 
A variety of western local issues faced 
Harrison as a candidate and as a president. He 
made two extensive journeys into the West-
one hurriedly arranged just before the elec-
tions of 1890 and a longer one in April and 
May 1891. Like other Americans in the late 
nineteenth century, westerners were anxious 
about a growing national role in local affairs. 
On the other hand, the president received 
much correspondence asking for federal inter-
vention, and some of it was easily justified. 
One issue that strongly affected California 
was Harrison's position on Chinese immigra-
tion. Since he had opposed the Chinese 
Exclusion Act as a senator, opposition newspa-
pers in California labeled Harrison as the pro-
Chinese candidate of the Republican party.49 
Harrison received a number of letters from 
friends regarding this issue. One explained 
that the Chinese immigration question "inter-
ests the people of the Pacific Coast almost as 
much as the tariff and the question of remone-
tization of silver." Harrison was advised to 
take a strong, clear stand on the problem.50 
Consequently, Harrison explained that he had 
opposed the Chinese exclusion bill because he 
256 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, FALL 1985 
thought it would violate the Burlingame 
Treaty with China, and also because he 
thought exclusion un-American.51 Later, in a 
letter of acceptance of his nomination to the 
presidency, Harrison wrote, 
The objections to Chinese immigration 
are distinctive and conclusive, and are now 
so generally accepted as such that the 
question has passed entirely beyond the 
stage of argument. The laws relating to this 
subject would, if I should be charged with 
their enforcement, be faithfully executed. 
Such amendments or further legislation as 
may be necessary and proper to prevent 
evasions of the laws and to stop further 
Chinese immigration would also meet with 
my approvalY 
In his inaugural address, Harrison did not 
mention the Chinese problem at all, stating 
only that "our naturalization laws should be so 
amended as to make the inquiry into the 
character and good disposition of persons 
applying for citizenship more careful and 
searching .... There are men of all races, even 
the best, whose coming is necessarily a burden 
upon our public revenues or a threat to social 
order."53 Later, Harrison's attorney general 
directed federal agents on the West Coast to 
investigate and prosecute illegal immigration 
by way of British Columbia. 54 
Specific acts of violence in the West also 
demanded Harrison's attention. He was 
startled by a death rate of twenty deputy 
federal marshals per year in Oklahoma T erri-
tory alone. This situation led to a request for 
rules supporting federal marshals and for 
federal statutes providing prosecution and 
penalties for killing a federal officer in line of 
dutyY 
The Battle or Massacre of Wounded Knee 
on 29 December 1890 prompted a presidential 
letter to the general in the field requesting 
information. The president, whose message 
was relayed by the commanding general, had 
heard with great regret of the failure of your 
efforts to secure the settlement of the Sioux 
difficulties without bloodshed .... He hopes 
that the report of the killing of women and 
children in the affair at Wounded Knee is 
unfounded, and directs that you cause an 
immediate inquiry to be made and report 
the result to the Department. If there was 
any unsoldierly conduct, you will relieve 
responsible officers, and so use the troops 
engaged there as to avoid its repetition. 56 
Even more of the president's time was 
spent on a case in which a former chief justice 
of the Supreme Court of California, David S. 
Terry, was shot and killed by a u.S. deputy 
marshal who was guarding Stephen]. Field, an 
associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Field was on circuit duty in California at the 
time. Terry had a long, stormy career and 
became an embittered enemy of Field, with 
whom he had served in a California court, 
when Field handed down a verdict of guilty in 
a case involving Terry and his wife. Terry's 
appeal for redress by the U.S. Supreme Court 
was denied, and President Cleveland refused 
him a pardon. President Harrison, anticipating 
violence, asked his attorney general to provide 
Field with the protection of a deputy marshal. 
This agent shot Terry when he was attacking 
Field from behind. The deputy marshal was 
arrested under California law, and eventually 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case, 
setting the marshal free without trial. Even 
earlier, Harrison had asked Congress to enact 
federal laws that would apply to cases of this 
natureY 
Other western local issues attracting the 
attention of Harrison and his administration 
include the Louisiana Lottery and a projected 
North Dakota lottery, which were limited in 
their use of the U.S. mails; the character of 
schools on Indian reservations, which were 
modified, in part, from religious to public 
schools; considerable expansion, mostly in the 
West, of agricultural experimentation on sugar 
production; a grant of amnesty for certain 
persons in Utah accused earlier of polygamous 
marriages; and intervention in the Coeur 
d' Alene strike in Idaho. 
Benjamin Harrison believed strongly in the 
separation of the executive and legislative 
functions of the federal government-he was a 
Whig at heart. Likewise, he interfered very 
little in the departments administered by his 
cabinet officers. Nevertheless, Republican con-
trol of both houses of Congress in 1889-90 was 
interpreted as a mandate for change. Legis-
lation during the first two years of the Harri-
son administration was so active and 
innovative that voters in 1890 recoiled from 
the prospect of a "vigorous government with 
enhanced powers to affect the lives of private 
citizens."5B Following the disastrous defeat of 
Republican congressmen in the election of 
1890, Harrison was not the person to "rally his 
party's flagging spirits."59 Most of the domestic 
legislation sponsored by the Harrison adminis-
tration, and most of its activity in response to 
western interests, occurred in the first two 
years. Far more of President Harrison's time in 
the final years of his administration was 
devoted to the issues in the field of foreign 
affairs. 
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